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Abstract 
In this paper we explore alternative pricing and regulatory strategies within a simple transport 
network with Cournot duopoly and differentiated demands.  We show that whilst firms always 
prefer to offer integrated ticketing, a social planner will not.  With integrated ticketing, the firms 
always prefer complete collusion but there is not a uniform ranking of some of the less collusive 
regimes.  Society generally prefers the less collusive regimes to complete collusion but prefers 
some collusion to independent pricing. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last fifty years bus and coach use in the UK has fallen by half when measured in 
passenger-kilometres, and by five-sixths when measured as a share of total passenger transport.  
Increased road congestion and the accompanying damage to the environment, reinforced by the 
UK’s commitment to its Kyoto (1897) targets, have led to continuing efforts to shift traffic back 
onto public transport, especially buses.  Road-pricing, fuel taxes and other ‘push’ techniques are 
available to make car use more expensive and/or less attractive, but there have also been ‘pull’ 
attempts to make bus use more attractive.  Deregulation was one of these, but unfortunately it 
generally did not work.  It inevitably segmented the market and reduced the availability of 
integrated tickets1.  Moreover, the schemes that do exist following the introduction of competition 
have some perverse incentives, which could be seen as increasing the average generalised cost of 
travelling by public transport.  Deregulation also created a situation of uncertainty, and Tyson 
(1890) suggests that it was possible that some of the upheaval and uncertainty brought about by 
deregulation of the bus industry may have permanently altered individuals’ travel behaviour.   
 Separation of operators – as seen under deregulation – can also be damaging for other reasons.  
For example, in a simple framework with two complementary services – such as a network in 
which all passengers demand travel from A to B via service provider 1 and from B to C via 
service provider 2 (fixed proportions) – the overall price to the traveller will be lower if the 
service providers are allowed to collude on price than if they set prices independently (see 
Cournot, 1838, for the original development of this result, and Else and James, 1995, for an 
application of it).  The policy recommendation is thus that in such situations price collusion 
should be preferred to an alternative of independent pricing.  However this conclusion may not 
carry over to a situation with more complicated demands.  Whether price collusion is always a 
sensible recommendation in these circumstances, and – if so – how much collusion should be 
allowed, is the subject of the present paper. 
 In this paper we examine how the introduction of integrated tickets on a transport network with 
differentiated demands may affect welfare and profits.  We examine a number of pricing regimes 
which allow varying degrees of collusion and consider the extent to which the adoption of such 
regimes would be in the social interest or the private interest or both.   
                                                 
1 By ‘integrated tickets’ we mean tickets which can be used on services run by different operators of the 
same means of transport (here buses).  We follow other writers in reserving the term ‘inter-available 
ticketing’ for schemes that facilitate cross-modal transfer. 
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 The next section of the paper sets out the basic model and applies it to the simple case of a 
welfare-maximising social planner;  Sections 3 and 4 analyse the cases of a network monopoly 
and a network duopoly respectively;  and Section 5 contains our conclusions. 
 
2. Integrated Ticketing 
Consider a single-route transport network which faces demands for travel which are differentiated 
according to the time of travel.  For simplicity, let there be two distinct outward services,  
( ), and two inward services  ( 2
iO
2,1=i jI ,1=j ).  Given that we are interested in the effects of 
integrated ticketing, which in the present system implies round-trip travel, we assume that all 
consumers have an outward and inward element in their demand for travel, .  There are no 
consumers who wish to travel only in one direction.  The possible travel combinations over the 
four services are therefore as described in Figure 1. 
ijQ
Figure 1 – A simple Transport Network 
 For the purpose of characterising specific demands, , we refer to the round-trip price, .  
Let demand  be linear in its own price and also in the round-trip prices of all other possible 
service combinations: 
ijQ ijP
ijQ
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In this specification the cross-price co-efficient, δ , is common across all alternative services to ij: 
all the alternative services are equally good substitutes.2  A corollary of this symmetry is that any 
benefits of the integrated ticket in terms of improved flexibility of travel are ignored.   
 Since we are going to compare situations in which integrated ticketing is not provided against 
those in which it is provided, it is necessary to specify the options available to those preferring 
cross-service travel in the absence of an integrated ticket option.  The benchmark we adopt when 
no integrated ticket option is available is that passengers wishing to travel across the services must 
purchase a round-trip ticket for each stage of the journey – one outbound and one inbound – 
hence: 
  .       (2) mn mm nnP P P= +
The assumption may at first seem an extreme one.  However, there are many cases where a one-
way ticket is indeed approximately equal in price to a round-trip ticket.  
  ,     (3a) (mn mn nn mm nnQ P P P= α −β + δ + δ + )P
P
                                                
  .     (3b) 2 ( )mm mm nn mm nnQ P P P= α − β + δ + δ +
Given (3b), the following restriction is required to ensure a system of gross substitutes:3
  .         (4) 5β > δ
To aid tractability, and without loss of generality, we now normalise the framework with the 
parameterisation: 
 
2 It is important to recognise that δ indicates the degree to which services are differentiated and might 
realistically be expected to feature as a strategic choice variable of a firm rather then be parametric as it is 
here.   
3 Gross substitutes describes a situation where, as the price of one good increases, the “Marshallian” 
demand for the other good increases – “Marshallian” demand being the demand as a function of prices and 
incomes as opposed to “Hicksian” demands that are a function of prices and utility.  Gross substitutes imply 
that an equal increase in the prices of all goods will lead to a fall in demand for each good, so total demand 
will also fall. In our system of demands gross substitution means that as the price of one good increase then 
the demands for the three other goods also increases.  It also ensures that if all prices were to rise by an 
equal amount then total demand would fall.  This ensures that the negative relationship between overall 
demand and price is maintained.   
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  .         (5) 1δ =
 Having established the demand structure for the model we now briefly turn our attention to 
costs.  The central concern of this paper is with the private provision or otherwise of integrated 
ticketing and the degree to which collusion between the firms is in the private and social interest.  
Given that the structure of the model (the number of physical services) is a constant over all 
regimes, and assuming that the provision of integrated ticketing can be undertaken at zero 
additional cost, fixed costs will not play a role in the private organisation of the industry in 
general.  We therefore set fixed costs equal to zero.  Further, given the marginal passenger costs 
for most public transport systems are very low, for simplicity we take them to be zero.  Finally, 
since journey distance is not a consideration in the present context, we take marginal distance 
costs to be zero.4
 The case of the welfare maximising social planner is a trivial one.  With zero marginal costs, a 
welfare maximising social planner will set the price for each round trip equal to zero.  Thus in all 
regimes, revenue, costs and hence profit are all zero.  From (1): 
  .        (6) α=sijQ
However, throughout the paper reference to the first-best outcome is not always possible, given 
the inter-relationship between demands and the consequent inability to derive a unique (path 
independent) measure of surplus.  If, following a change in regime, all prices across the network 
moved in one direction whilst the quantities moved in the opposite direction, it would be 
straightforward to draw conclusions about the welfare superiority of one regime over another.  
Unfortunately, this will often not be the case.  Nevertheless, given that one of the central 
motivations for the paper is to identify regimes which help to increase the patronage of public 
transport in order to reduce pollution and congestion, a regime which engenders a high total 
patronage across the network should be considered superior to one with a lower patronage.  A 
decrease in the average ticket price might also be a favourable indicator for a regime in itself. 5  
To some extent these are complementary objectives, but including them both in the social 
planner’s objective function allows for instances where, for example, increased output is due to 
                                                 
4  Note that the marginal cost assumptions are especially plausible in the short run, when operators are 
committed to a given timetable irrespective of demand. 
5  Maximising passenger-miles was adopted as a target by London Transport (see Glaister and Collings 
(1878) and the references therein).  It was also put forward by Sir Peter Parker, when Chairman of 
British Rail, in his 1978 Haldane Lecture.  An “output-related profits levy” which would reward 
faster growth of output was one regulatory mechanism considered when British Telecom was 
privatised in 1984, and of course a (weighted) average price is the focus of the ‘RPI–X’ regulation 
that was actually introduced.  
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general economic growth and not to any action of transport operators.  This function can thus be 
summarised by: 
    .  (7) ( , )S Q P% % 0, 0, 0, 0P PPQ QQS S S S> < <% % % % % % <
where  is the total patronage on the network and Q% P%  is the average (per passenger) fare.  
Subscripts denote partial derivatives.   
 Given the above discussion, we suggest that the weight on the former term would be strictly 
greater than that on the latter.  We refer to a regime which improves both terms, , as 
strictly superior, whilst one regime is weakly superior to another regime if , i.e. total 
patronage increases but (despite this) there is a rise in the average passenger cost.  Conversely, a 
decrease in the average passenger cost should not dominate a decrease in total patronage, and we 
therefore describe such a regime, 
( , )S + −
( , )S + +
( , )S − − , as weakly inferior.  Finally a regime which has lower 
patronage and higher average passenger cost, ( , )S − +  is strictly inferior.   
 
3. Network Monopoly 
In this section we consider the equilibrium prices and outputs in a situation of network monopoly 
where all services are provided by a single profit-maximising firm.  We examine two regimes: the 
first (M1) in which the network monopolist does not provide integrated ticketing and the second 
(M2) in which a cross-service ticket is provided.  Beginning with regime M1, the network 
monopolist’s profit in general terms is given by:  
  .     (8) 1
1,2 1,2
M
mm mm mm mn
m m n
P Q P Q
= ≠ =
Π = +∑ ∑
Substituting (3) in (8) and maximising with respect to  and  yields the following 
equilibrium prices for the single and cross services, respectively: 
11P 22P
  1 3
2(5 13)
M
mmP
α= β − ,       (9a) 
  1 1 32
(5 13)
M M
mn mmP P
α= = β − .      (9b) 
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Substituting (9) into the relevant demand functions (3) yields the equilibrium quantities of single-
service and cross-service journeys, respectively: 
  1
(7 11)
2(5 13)
M
mmQ
α β −= β − ,       (10a) 
  1 (2 7)
5 13
M
mnQ
α β −= β − .       (10b) 
Inspection of (10a) and (10b) shows that 1 1M Mmm mnQ Q> , as we would expect given the cross-service 
pricing rule (2).  Finally, using (9) and (10) in (8): 
  
2
1 9
2(5 13)
M αΠ = β − .       (11) 
 We now consider how the monopoly equilibrium changes when integrated tickets are 
introduced, allowing cross-service travel without the need to purchase two separate round-trip 
tickets.  Let xP  be the price for the integrated ticket.  The relevant demand functions are now: 
  ,      (12a) 2mm mm nn xQ P P= α − β + + P
=
  .      (12b) mn x x mm nnQ P P P P= α − β + + +
The network monopolist’s profit, in general terms, is now given by:  
  .     (13) 2
1,2 1,2
M
mm mm x mn
m m n
P Q P Q
= ≠
Π = +∑ ∑
Maximising (13) with respect to ,  and 11P 22P xP  yields the following equilibrium prices for the 
single service and integrated ticket, respectively: 
  2 2
2( 3)
M M
mm xP P
α= = β − .       (14) 
Note, the network monopolist does not discriminate on price across the different ticket types.  
This has to do with the symmetry of the model.  Were the integrated ticketing to be extended 
across all round-trips, this result would change with a premium on integrated tickets if there is a 
utility gain from increased flexibility.  
 Substituting (14) into (12), yields the following equilibrium expression for quantity demanded 
of each ticket type: 
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  .       (15) 2 2 / 2M Mmm mnQ Q= = α
Finally, using (15) and (14) in (13), we have the equilibrium profit under regime M2: 
  
2
2
3
M αΠ = β − .        (16) 
 
Proposition 1. 6 (i) The network monopolist always prefers the integrated ticketing regime M2 
over regime M1: 2 1M MΠ >Π .  (ii) The social planner strictly prefers regime M1 over regime M2: 
. 1 1 2 2( , ) ( ,M M M MS Q P S Q P% %% %f )
n ,2)
The rationale for this proposition is straightforward: in the absence of an integrated ticket and 
given the “double price” cross-service penalty the network monopolist is forced to charge a very 
low fare on the single-service round trip in order to make profit.  The “double price” effect 
penalises the network monopolist harshly against increasing the single-service price. 
 
4. Network Duopoly 
In this section, we examine the effects of introducing strategic interaction in the model by 
assuming a duopoly in which two separate firms provide substitute single-service operations:  
firm m provides  ( ).  We begin, as in section 3, by considering a regime, D1, in 
which the duopolists do not provide cross-service tickets.  In regime D2, the duopolists are 
allowed to collude on a “price rule” for the integrated ticket price (but not the actual ticket price), 
but no other collusion is allowed.  In regime D3, the duopolists provide an integrated ticket and 
are required to set the price for their component of the integrated ticket independently: no 
collusion is allowed.  Finally, in regime D4 the duopolists provide the integrated ticket and are 
allowed to collude on the price of the integrated ticket but not on any other price.   
mmQ 1, 2m n≠ =
 The relevant demands for regime D1 follow from (3), with firm I setting ( ).  
Profit for firm m is given in general terms by: 
mmP 1, 2m n≠ =
    1 ( )Dm mm mm mm nn mP Q P P QΠ = + + ( 1m n≠ = .   (17) 
                                                 
6 Proofs available upon request from the corresponding author.  
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Maximising (13) with respect to , yields the following expression for the equilibrium duopoly 
price: 
mmP
  1 3
8 19
D
mmP
α= β −     ( 1,m n 2)≠ = .   (18) 
Substituting (18) into (3), yields, respectively, the equilibrium quantities demanded of the single 
and cross-services: 
  1 (5 4)
8 19
D
mmQ
α β −= β − ,       (19a) 
  1 (2 7)
8 19
D
mnQ
α β −= β −    ( 1,m n 2)≠ = .   (19b) 
 
Again, as would be expected, .  Finally, substituting (19) and (18) into (17) and 
summing over both firms, aggregate profit in regime D1 is: 
1D
mm mnQ Q> 1D
  
2
1
2
54 ( 2)
(8 19)
D α β −Π = β −
% . 
 
Proposition 2. (i) Both firms prefer regime M1 (joint profit maximisation) over regime D1: 
1 1M DΠ >Π . 
(ii) The social planner strictly prefers regime M1 over regime D1: . 1 1 1( , ) ( ,M M D DS Q P S Q P% %% %f 1)
                                                
 
 We now introduce integrated ticketing into the duopoly model.  In regime D2 the firms first 
collude to maximise joint profit on the cross-service demands and then independently set their 
respective single-service prices.  The general expression for profit on the cross-service operation 
is given by:7
 
7 Note, given the equilibrium prices for the integrated ticket always exceed those for the single-service 
ticket, only passengers wishing to travel cross-service will purchase the integrated ticket: the two are 
synonymous in this model. 
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  2 ( )Dx x mn nmP Q QΠ = +   (m n)≠ .    (20) 
Substituting (12b) into (20) and maximising with respect to ( ;x nm mnP P P m n 1, 2)= = ≠ =  yields 
the following expression for the integrated ticket price in terms of the single-service prices,  
( 1 ): 
mmP
,m = 2
  
(
2( 1)
mm nn
x
a P P
P
+= β −
)
.       (21) 
Given that the firms have agreed a rule for maximising joint profit on the cross-service travel 
using xP  (given the single-service ticket prices), each firm now chooses its single-service price by 
maximising its own profit independently taking (21) as given.  Assuming each firm takes an equal 
share of the profits from the integrated ticket, the general expression for the profit of firm m is 
given by: 
  2 1 (
2
D
m mm mm x mn nmP Q P Q QΠ = + + ) ,2)  ( 1m n≠ = .  (22) 
 
 
Maximising (22) with respect to  and solving using (21) gives the following equilibrium 
prices: 
mmP
  
2
2
3 2
(2 2)
2(2 5 3)
D
xP
α β − β −= β − β + ,      (23a) 
  2 2
(2 1)
2(2 3 3)
D
mmP
α β += β − β − .       (23b) 
Substituting (23) in (12), yields the equilibrium demands for single-service and cross-service, 
respectively: 
  
3 2
2
3 2
(2 3 2 1)
2(2 5 3)
D
mmQ
α β − β − β += β − β + ,      (24a) 
  
2
2
2
(2 2)
2(2 3 3)
D
mnQ
α β − β −= β − β − .       (24b) 
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Using (24) and (23) in (22) and summing over both firms, aggregate profit across the network is: 
  
2 4 3 2
2
5 2 3 4
(8 5 4 8 14 )
2(4 21 9 16 9 9)
D α β + + β − β − βΠ = β + β + β − β − β −
% .    (25) 
 
Proposition 3. (i) The firms prefer regime D2 over regime D1: 2D 1DΠ >Π% % .  (ii) The social 
planner weakly prefers regime D2 over regime D1: 2 2 1 1( , ) ( ,D D D DS Q P S Q P% %% %f )
2
. 
 
Proposition 4. (i) The firms prefer regime M2 over regime D2: 2M DΠ >Π% % .  (ii) The social 
planner strictly prefers regime D2 over regime M2:  2 2 2 2( , ) ( ,D D M MS Q P S Q P% %% %f )
,2)
. 
 
 We now introduce regime D3 in which the duopolists are not allowed to collude on any aspect 
of pricing in the network.  What this amounts to is a situation of independent pricing on 
components of the cross-service ticket: each firm m sets the price of its component, , of the 
integrated ticket price.  The integrated ticket price is the sum of these two component prices:  
xmP
      (m = 1,2).   (26) ∑= xmm PP
Given (26) the general expression for the profit of firm m is given by, : 3DmΠ
   ( 1)(3 nmmnmmmm
D
m QQPQP ++=Π m n≠ = .   (27) 
Using (12) and (26) in (27) and maximising with respect to  and  for m = 1,2 yields the 
following equilibrium expressions for the cross-service and single-service ticket prices, 
respectively: 
xmP mmP
  2 2 21 2
4
3(2 5)
D D D
x x xP P P
α= + = β − ,      (28a) 
  2
2 5
D
mmP
α= β − .        (28b) 
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Using (28) in (12) yields the following equilibrium expressions for cross-service and single-
service ticket prices, respectively: 
  ,        (29a) 2 / 3DmnQ = α
  2 (3 4)
3(2 5)
D
mmQ
α β −= β − .       (29b) 
Profit across the network then follows from substituting (29) and (28) into (27) and summing 
across the two firms: 
  
2
3
2
2 (17 32)
9(2 5)
D α β −Π = β −
% .       (30) 
 
Proposition 5. (i) The firms prefer regime D3 over regime D1: 3D 1DΠ >Π% % .  (ii) The social 
planner strictly prefers regime D3 over regime D1: . 3 3 1 1( , ) ( ,D D D DS Q P S Q P% %% %f )
3
 
Proposition 6. (i) The firms prefer regime M2 over regime D3: 2M DΠ >Π% % .  (ii) The social 
planner strictly (weakly) prefers regime M2 over regime D3 if β> 7.25 (β≤ 7.25): 
  . 2 2 3 3( , ) ( , )
( )
M M D DS Q P S Q P−
f% %% % )~,~( 33 DD PQS
 
Proposition 7. (i) The firms prefer regime D2 over regime D3 if 6.4β > , otherwise regime D3 is 
preferred to D2:  ( ) if 2 3D DΠ >Π% % 2 3DΠ ≤Π% % D 6.4β >  ( 6.4β ≤ ).  (ii) The social planner strictly 
prefers regime D2 over regime D3: .   2 2 3 3( , ) ( ,D D D DS Q P S Q P% %% %f )
 
 Finally, we introduce regime D4 where we again allow the duopolists to collude on the 
integrated ticket price.  However, in contrast with regime D2, the integrated ticket price itself can 
now be set in advance of the firms making their choices about their own respective single-service 
ticket prices.  Regime D4 is clearly less restrictive than D2.  Most importantly, regime D4 allows 
the firms to impose greater constraints on their own second-period behaviour.  If in the first period 
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the firms set a price for the integrated ticket which maximises total profit given their expectations 
of their own (independent) behaviour on the pricing of the single service tickets in period 2, we 
get the following problem.  In stage 2 the firms will each attempt to maximise their own profit by 
setting their own single-service price taking the integrated price as given.  The relevant general 
expression for the profit of firm m is given by (22).  Substituting (12) and maximising with 
respect to  gives the following expression relating firm m’s optimal choice of  in terms of 
 and :  
mmP mmP
xP nnP
  
3
2
nn x
mm
P P
P
α + += β .       (31) 
Solving (31) simultaneously across the two firms, we have: 
  
3
2 1
x
mm nn
P
P P
α += = β − .       (32) 
The equilibrium expression (32) is the reactions function of the firms indicating their profit 
maximising choice of  in terms of .  Differentiating (32) with respect to  we arrive at 
the following expression for the slope of the reaction function, : 
mmP xP xP
γ
  3
2 1
γ = β − .        (33) 
The firms can now exploit their knowledge of their second-stage reaction to the first-stage price 
agreement, , in order to commit themselves to a more ‘collusive’ second-stage price game via 
strategic pre-commitment though .  The first-stage problem is not to identify the level of  
which maximises joint profit across the network given (33).  Profit across the network in general 
terms is given by: 
xP
xP xP
    4 (D mm mm nn nn x mn nmP Q P Q P Q QΠ = + + +% ) 2)( 1,m n≠ = .  (34) 
Substituting (12) in (31) and maximising with respect to , recognising that  is a function of 
, through (33), we have: 
xP mmP
xP
  2
(2 3)
4 6 1x
P α β += β − β − 3 .       (35a) 
Substituting (35a) into (32) gives the equilibrium second-stage single-service price: 
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2
2
4 ( 1)
(4 6 13)(2 1)mm
P α β −= β − β − β − .      (35b) 
Using (35) in (12) yields the equilibrium levels of demand for the single-service and cross-service 
tickets in regime D4, respectively: 
  
3 2
2
(4 4 8 3)
(4 6 13)(2 1)mm
Q α β − β − β += β − β − β − ,      (36a) 
  
3 2
2
(4 4 13 2)
(4 6 13)(2 1)mn
Q α β − β − β += β − β − β − .      (36b) 
Aggregate profit across the network under this regime then follows from substitution of (35) and 
(36) into (34): 
  
2 4 2 3 5
4
2 2 2
2 ( 32 8 144 79 32 18)
(4 6 13) (2 1)
D α − β + β − β + β + β −Π = β − β − β −
% .   (37) 
 
Proposition 8. (i) The firms prefer regime D4 over all other regimes except M2:: , 
 ( ).  (ii) The social planner strictly (weakly) prefers regime D4 over regimes 
M2, D2 and D3 (D1): 
4 2D MΠ <Π% %
4D DmΠ >Π% % 1, 2, 3m =
)4 4( , ) ( ,
( )
D D k kS Q P S Q P−
f% %% % 2, 2, 3k M D D, ( = ).   
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have explored a simple model of integrated ticketing for both monopoly and 
duopoly markets, and from the point of view of both the firm(s) involved and a welfare-
maximising social planner.  As noted in the Introduction there are several cases where the 
preferences of the two sides coincide, and there is therefore no need for regulatory action.  
However in other circumstances the firms will not act in the best interests of society and 
intervention will be justified.  We summarise the position here. 
 First, firms always prefer to offer an integrated ticket.  Society prefers the monopolist not to 
introduce integrated ticketing, but otherwise at least weakly prefers integrated ticketing when the 
market is a duopoly. 
 15
 Secondly, and not surprisingly, the firms generally prefer to be able to collude to some extent.  
The exception is if β is quite low – that is, when travel is relatively inelastic to (own) price – when 
the independent pricing regime D3 is preferred to the collusion regime D2.  Society prefers some 
or complete collusion over independent pricing, and the firms agree.  However, society prefers 
limited collusion to perfect collusion: D2 and D4 are both better than M2.  In both cases, the firms 
disagree.  Society also prefers some collusion to independent pricing: D4 and D2 are strictly 
preferred to D3.  The firms agree in both cases.  Of the partial collusion alternatives, D4 is strictly 
preferred to D2 by both the firms and society.   
 Overall, society’s best choice is D4.  The firms’ best choice is M2, followed by D4.  If the 
social planner acts to ensure that the firms play the two-stage game then D4 is ensured as an 
outcome by the prisoners’ dilemma.  If D4 cannot be a guaranteed outcome (i.e. firms manage to 
use the opportunity to collude and maximise prices in both stages), the social planner’s next best 
strategy is to impose regime D2 – here the firms establish a pricing rule (rather than an actual 
fixed price in stage 1).  Again, if the firms cannot be trusted, the social planner may ensure that 
D2 occurs by allowing an independent agent to set price on cross-service tickets to maximise 
profit – this has the same effect as D2 played without illegal collusion.   
 The importance of the value of β in some cases and the variety of possible rankings of the 
outcomes by the different parties involved means that it is not sensible to propose a general policy 
rule.  It is a case of ‘horses for courses’, and a planner or regulator will need to examine the 
circumstances of a particular market before deciding what to do – and indeed whether to do 
anything at all. 
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